Atom Formation Rates Behind Shock Waves in Hydrogen and the Effect of Added Oxygen, July 1965 - July 1966

Formation rate of atomic hydrogen behind shock waves in hydrogen-argon mixture

Budget Feasible Mechanisms for Experimental Design

In the classical experimental design setting, an experimenter E has access to a population of $n$ potential experiment subjects $i\in \{1,...,n\}$, each associated with a vector of features $x_i\in R^d$. Conducting an experiment with subject $i$ reveals an unknown value $y_i\in R$ to E. E typically assumes some hypothetical relationship between $x_i$'s and $y_i$'s, e.g., $y_i \approx \beta x_i$, and estimates $\beta$ from experiments, e.g., through linear regression. As a proxy for various practical constraints, E may select only a subset of subjects on which to conduct the experiment. We initiate the study of budgeted mechanisms for experimental design. In this setting, E has a budget $B$. Each subject $i$ declares an associated cost $c_i >0$ to be part of the experiment, and must be paid at least her cost. In particular, the Experimental Design Problem (EDP) is to find a set $S$ of subjects for the experiment that maximizes V(S) = \log\det(I_d+\sum_{i\in S}x_i\T{x_i}) under the constraint $\sum_{i\in S}c_i\leq B$; our objective function corresponds to the information gain in parameter $\beta$ that is learned through linear regression methods, and is related to the so-called $D$-optimality criterion. Further, the subjects are strategic and may lie about their costs. We present a deterministic, polynomial time, budget feasible mechanism scheme, that is approximately truthful and yields a constant factor approximation to EDP. In particular, for any small $\delta > 0$ and $\epsilon > 0$, we can construct a (12.98, $\epsilon$)-approximate mechanism that is $\delta$-truthful and runs in polynomial time in both $n$ and $\log\log\frac{B}{\epsilon\delta}$. We also establish that no truthful, budget-feasible algorithms is possible within a factor 2 approximation, and show how to generalize our approach to a wide class of learning problems, beyond linear regression

Optimal Design of Robust Combinatorial Mechanisms for Substitutable Goods

In this paper we consider multidimensional mechanism design problem for selling discrete substitutable items to a group of buyers. Previous work on this problem mostly focus on stochastic description of valuations used by the seller. However, in certain applications, no prior information regarding buyers' preferences is known. To address this issue, we consider uncertain valuations and formulate the problem in a robust optimization framework: the objective is to minimize the maximum regret. For a special case of revenue-maximizing pricing problem we present a solution method based on mixed-integer linear programming formulation

Fixed Price Approximability of the Optimal Gain From Trade

Bilateral trade is a fundamental economic scenario comprising a strategically acting buyer and seller, each holding valuations for the item, drawn from publicly known distributions. A mechanism is supposed to facilitate trade between these agents, if such trade is beneficial. It was recently shown that the only mechanisms that are simultaneously DSIC, SBB, and ex-post IR, are fixed price mechanisms, i.e., mechanisms that are parametrised by a price p, and trade occurs if and only if the valuation of the buyer is at least p and the valuation of the seller is at most p. The gain from trade is the increase in welfare that results from applying a mechanism; here we study the gain from trade achievable by fixed price mechanisms. We explore this question for both the bilateral trade setting, and a double auction setting where there are multiple buyers and sellers. We first identify a fixed price mechanism that achieves a gain from trade of at least 2/r times the optimum, where r is the probability that the seller's valuation does not exceed the buyer's valuation. This extends a previous result by McAfee. Subsequently, we improve this approximation factor in an asymptotic sense, by showing that a more sophisticated rule for setting the fixed price results in an expected gain from trade within a factor O(log(1/r)) of the optimal gain from trade. This is asymptotically the best approximation factor possible. Lastly, we extend our study of fixed price mechanisms to the double auction setting defined by a set of multiple i.i.d. unit demand buyers, and i.i.d. unit supply sellers. We present a fixed price mechanism that achieves a gain from trade that achieves for all epsilon > 0 a gain from trade of at least (1-epsilon) times the expected optimal gain from trade with probability 1 - 2/e^{#T epsilon^2 /2}, where #T is the expected number of trades resulting from the double auction

Quantum Games and Quantum Strategies

We investigate the quantization of non-zero sum games. For the particular case of the Prisoners' Dilemma we show that this game ceases to pose a dilemma if quantum strategies are allowed for. We also construct a particular quantum strategy which always gives reward if played against any classical strategy.Comment: 4 pages, 4 figures, typographic sign error in the definition of the operator J correcte

Charge Transport in the Dense Two-Dimensional Coulomb Gas

The dynamics of a globally neutral system of diffusing Coulomb charges in two dimensions, driven by an applied electric field, is studied in a wide temperature range around the Berezinskii-Kosterlitz-Thouless transition. I argue that the commonly accepted ``free particle drift'' mechanism of charge transport in this system is limited to relatively low particle densities. For higher densities, I propose a modified picture involving collective ``partner transfer'' between bound pairs. The new picture provides a natural explanation for recent experimental and numerical findings which deviate from standard theory. It also clarifies the origin of dynamical scaling in this context.Comment: 4 pages, RevTeX, 2 eps figures included; some typos corrected, final version to be published in Phys. Rev. Let

The Polar Expression of ENSO and Sea-Ice Variability as Recorded in a South Pole Ice Core

An annually dated ice core recovered from South Pole (2850 in a.s.l.) in 1995, that covers the period 1487-1992, was analyzed for the marine biogenic sulfur species methanesulfonate (MS). Empirical orthogonal function analysis is used to calibrate the high-resolution MS series with associated environmental series for the period of overlap (1973-92). Utilizing this calibration we present a similar to500 year long proxy record of the polar expression of the El Nino-Southern Oscillation (ENSO) and southeastern Pacific sea-ice extent variations. These records reveal short-term periods of increased (1800-50, 1900-40) and decreased sea-ice extent (1550-1610., 1660-1710, 1760-1800). In general, increased (decreased) sea-ice extent is associated with a higher (lower) frequency of El Nino events

Evolution of Cooperation and Coordination in a Dynamically Networked Society

Situations of conflict giving rise to social dilemmas are widespread in society and game theory is one major way in which they can be investigated. Starting from the observation that individuals in society interact through networks of acquaintances, we model the co-evolution of the agents' strategies and of the social network itself using two prototypical games, the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Stag Hunt. Allowing agents to dismiss ties and establish new ones, we find that cooperation and coordination can be achieved through the self-organization of the social network, a result that is non-trivial, especially in the Prisoner's Dilemma case. The evolution and stability of cooperation implies the condensation of agents exploiting particular game strategies into strong and stable clusters which are more densely connected, even in the more difficult case of the Prisoner's Dilemma.Comment: 18 pages, 14 figures. to appea

Concurrent chemoradiotherapy for squamous cell carcinoma of the anus using a shrinking field radiotherapy technique without a boost

Chemoradiotherapy (CRT) is now widely accepted as the primary treatment modality for squamous cell cancer of the anus. While randomised trials have clearly shown CRT to be more effective than radiotherapy alone, there remains uncertainty over the optimal integration of chemotherapy and radiation. We describe a series of 50 patients treated by a site specialist gastrointestinal nonsurgical oncologist with CRT at a single UK centre. Chemotherapy comprised mitomycin C (MMC) (day 1) and 5-fluorouracil (5-FU) (days 1–4, and 29–32), concurrent with 50 Gy in 25 fractions radiation, using a two-phase shrinking field technique. A radiation boost was not planned. At a median follow-up of 48 months, 11 (22%) of the patients have failed locally, of which three have been surgically salvaged. Nine (18%) have died of anal cancer. These results are comparable with those from large randomised studies, and suggest that a two-phase shrinking field radiotherapy technique with no boost, concurrent with MMC/5-FU chemotherapy, is an effective regimen for this disease. The CRT regimen described here provides the basis for the ‘control arm’ of the current UK-randomised CRT trial in anal cancer (ACT2)